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The basic thesis of this paper is that Southeast Asia will be the crucible and the testing ground for a new 
Euro-American partnership. Both the United States and the European Union have vital interests in 
Southeast Asia. These interests certainly involve economics. They definitely concern security issues. And, 
for both the United States and the European Union, though for similar reasons differently nuanced, 
these interests aspire to the realm of ideals and idealism, of norms and normativism. 
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The New Globalism and Power 
 
The present global economic crisis camouflages the underlying technological revolution 
transforming us all – including the framework of our global relations. Information 
technology is engendering wholesale structural change economically and socially at 
historically unprecedented breakneck speed. Jobs lost, for example, in the United States 
during this recession of some three years will, for the most part, be lost in the dustbin of 
history. The workers who once toiled at those jobs, if they cannot be retrained, and most 
will not be able to be retrained for reasons of age or available skill sets, will find 
themselves sidelined. To expect the world to right itself according to previous standards 
of normalcy is to whistle in the dark. Change now occurs at a faster clip than at any time 
since the sixteenth century. An individual born today can expect to experience several 
lifetimes worth of change within his own lifespan. We now begin to probe the impact of 
the computer upon our brains and upon genetic selection. Are we moving to a new 
evolutionary rung?  Within this context how could the global order itself not be 
transformed? 
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Certain postulates about our global order can be made. We are moving light years away 
from a Eurocentric world order which held sway from roughly the eighteenth century to 
World War I. New powers, especially in Asia, are rising on the horizon. Social media 
empower the masses, whether it be in the Arab Spring or the Occupy Wall Street 
Movement and these social media operate globally. Individuals now traverse the globe 
not simply as tourists but as job-seekers and as house hunters. Higher education has 
turned transnational: students study in foreign countries and universities establish 
centers abroad. Increasingly, individuals work from home via personal computers. 
 
Movement and change characterize our time. Both variables have iconoclastic 
tendencies. Boundaries wither. Identities expand. Loyalties grow complex. Perspectives 
hybridize. Personal tastes relish novelty. And new geographic hot spots emerge. In his 
book Monsoon Robert D. Kaplan writes that “the Greater Indian Ocean, stretching 
eastward from the Horn of Africa past the Arabian Peninsula, the Iranian plateau, and 
the Indian subcontinent, all the way to the Indonesian archipelago and beyond, may 
comprise a map as iconic to the new century as Europe was to the last one.”1   Kaplan 
notes that in and around the Indian Ocean the rivalry between the United States and 
China interlocks with the regional rivalry between China and India. Also any United 
States’ strike against Iran in its effort to contain Iran “will have an Indian Ocean 
address.”2  Southeast Asia finds its home in the Indian Ocean. 
 
In November 2011 President Barack Obama of the United States visited Indonesia. He 
gave a strong, singular message: the United States must secure tighter relations with 
Southeast Asia. Having spent childhood years in Jakarta, Obama has personal ties to 
Indonesia that might explain his political orientation. But this factor alone does not 
suffice to explain foreign policy emphasis. The United States has a Pacific Ocean 
coastline. It has had a history of involvement politically and economically in Asia. Mark 
Philip Bradley in his book, Imaging Vietnam and America, details the fascination 
Vietnamese anti-colonial revolutionaries like Ho Chi Minh, who visited New York City in 
1912, had for the American political model at the turn of the twentieth century. The 
United States, after all, had fought and won a war against British colonialism. The 
United States sharply criticized French colonialism in Indochina. It held up its own 
success in the Philippines as the alternative model to what it considered the French 
bureaucratic colonial nightmare and failure. While the United States reinstated the 
French in Indochina after World War II, rather than working with nationalist figures 
like Ho Chi Minh who then gravitated into the Soviet orbit, United States-French 
relations soured after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and, certainly, during 
the subsequent American military involvement from 1955-1975 (fall of Saigon). In short, 
the United States stood forth as an attractive alternate Western model – commercial, 
pragmatic (as opposed to philosophical like the French) and revolutionary. Asians either 
admired this model, like Vietnam, or feared its consequences for Asia, like China and 
Japan as dominant Asian powers.  
 
                                                 
1 R. D. Kaplan. Monsoon. New York, Random House. 2010. p. xi. 
2 Ibid, p. 9.      
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Today the United States exports more than $50 billion in goods to ASEAN countries per 
year. Only Canada, Mexico, Japan and the European Union offer larger markets for 
American goods. American private sector investment in ASEAN exceeds $800 billion, 
surpassing U.S. investments in either China, Japan or India. The European Union 
stands as ASEAN’s third largest trading partner after the United States and Japan. With 
a population topping 570 million, ASEAN remains of the largest regional markets in the 
world. (By way of comparison, the European Union has a population of some 500 
million while the United States population is about 300 million.)  Singapore, Brunei 
Darussalam and Malaysia are the fastest growing and wealthiest of the ASEAN tigers, 
with Myanmar (Burma) and Vietnam suffering the most repressive regimes and 
stagnant economies. Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines and Thailand find 
themselves in the middle of the growth spectrum. The combined GDP of ASEAN states 
is 870 billion euros. In comparison, the EU’s GDP registers over 12 trillion euros.3   
 
Is the United States really a Western power? This question from a colleague originally 
from Uruguay, but now living and working in New York City took me aback. Had there 
ever been any doubt that the United States is a Western power?  The frame of reference 
here remains NATO, consequence of World War II and the Cold War. The context 
deepens into the Western tradition, Western values. Primarily, the Enlightenment. Is 
the United States a Western Power?  The question should be rephrased for today’s 
circumstances. Is the United States a Western power in our globalized world?   
 
Behind this question lies the assumption that geographically-designated cultural regions 
will become increasingly meaningless in a globalized world with the mass migration of 
people and information. Geographical boundaries no longer contain and isolate. With 
the global market, isolationism becomes self-defeating. State participation in the global 
market of goods and information is the key to   survival. We are witnessing this in 
Myanmar today as it gradually begins to relax its dictatorial control and to open up. 
Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France, has warned Europe that it must get its financial 
house in order or Europe will cease to be a global actor. As Asia brings forth new 
sprightly tigers, upping the edge of global competition, President Obama’s desire to have 
closer relations with Southeast Asia, and Asia generally, becomes self-evident. We are, 
predictably, entering the Asian Century. What state will not be interested in Asia? 
 
At  the same time globalisation is not only about commercial exchange. The world 
remains a dangerous place. Increased interaction demands attention to questions of law 
and order. Pressures of population and production will require global public policy 
measures to protect the earth’s resources and its environment. We may even stand at 
the threshold of an international social contract.  
 
The United States and Europe will be front line players in the global arena. The United 
States will not necessarily regret its loss of hegemony in a possible post-American world 
order. Former Secretary of State Robert Gates has warned that the United States can no 
longer afford more Iraqs. Significantly, the United Nations and Europeans participated 
in the 2011 Libyan operation against Quadaffi. What former U.S. President Bill Clinton 
                                                 
3 EUobserver.com. March 2, 2009.   
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called “burden-sharing” would appear to be the wave of the future. Regional actors will 
be increasingly responsible for maintaining stability in their regions and thus globally. 
In Asia, Elizabeth Economy sees China as stepping up to bat: 
 
For the United States, in the best case scenario, a more activist China Will share 
leadership with the United States and Japan, helping to forge consensus within a more 
active and integrated region to address its political security and economic challenges. 
Such an Asia would likely have a better chance of either pressuring or inducing change 
in some of the more recalcitrant actors in the region such as Burma and North Korea. 
There might also be an opportunity for regional actors to relieve the United 
 
States of some of the burden of regional crises such as the humanitarian crisis 
brought on by the tsunami in South Asia in 2004, political unrest in Indonesia or 
in coordinating a response on transnational or global threats such as terrorism.4  
 
The United States also looks to Japan in this capacity. Certainly India, a vibrant 
democracy, will be another plausible regional actor in the Indian Ocean scenario 
described by Robert Kaplan. Australia has been a stalwart partner of the United States 
and assumedly will continue to help stabilize the “down under.” It stands to reason that 
with the economic boom all over Asia and with its significant population mass, Asia will 
remain on everyone’s radar. 
 
Colonialism is dead and buried. Postcolonial theorists will have to begin rethinking the 
meaning of culture hybridity, even Orientalism. The new cultural adjustment demands 
emanate from the impact of IT which confronts us all, East and West, North and South. 
Whether we like it or not, we must change and adjust to our new global social 
intercourse. To opt out is to perish. The name of the new global game is mutual benefit,  
not divide and rule. 
 
The Europeans have for some time been adjusting to the loss of their Eurocentric world. 
The creation of the European Union has given them a new perspective and a new 
mission civilisatrice - a global mission. This mission entails promoting regional 
integration throughout the world by peaceful measures. For the Europeans, Asia, and 
southeast Asia in particular, beckons – not only for its economic opportunities but for 
its nascent regional integration attempts in ASEAN 
 
While the United States and Europe are often spoken of in the same breath, important 
differences divide these “Western powers.”  It is our contention here that these 
differences can be coordinated into a two-track global policy of global utility. Let us 
review the differences and then examine the global policy possibility. 
 
                                                 
4 Elizabeth Economy, ‘China’s Rise in Southeast Asia: Implications for the United States.’ Journal of 
Contemporary China.Vol 14 No. 44, 2005, 44, p. 411. 
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The United States and Europe: A Historical Image 
 
The early leaders of the American Republic – George Washington, James Madison, 
Thomas Jefferson, Tom Paine, regarded Europe with great skepticism. Certainly, as 
revolutionaries, they saw “old Europe” as repressive and outmoded. Jefferson extolled 
the American experiment in “agrarian republicanism” based upon the farmer who 
embraced all the virtues of a true democratic citizen – independence, hard work and 
rationality, and warned against the over-crowded, rentier urban population of Europe. 
Washington counseled against “foreign entanglements” with Europe, assuming such 
entanglements would corrupt the American democratic experiment. 
 
Although monarchical France assisted the Americans in their revolution, its motive was, 
of course, political – to damage Britain. A long-standing rivalry exists between the two 
countries to this very day as the outstanding Western models of revolutionary 
democracy. Of English origin, American democracy manifests the principles of John 
Locke, both in its Constitution, its social doctrine and its economic preference. The 
United States, as Louis Hartz reminds us in his classic work, Liberal Democracy in 
America, had no feudal past. The American colonists encountered a virtually pristine 
land –the native inhabitants of which they “subdued,” a land without the weight of 
historical traditions, a “state of nature,” as described metaphorically by Locke, which 
allowed for the original “social contract.”  Following the Lockean scheme, American 
democracy has emphasized unencumbered individualism, private property (of which the 
Whig Locke was the first apologist) and democratic governance based on separation of 
powers, majority rule and minority protection. American democracy, as Frederick 
Jackson Turner postulates, became re-enforced through the conquest of the frontier. 
European aristocratic titles had no meaning on the frontier. Class differences dissipated. 
Individualism surged. American democracy, as a model, evinced brashness, personal 
initiative, material conquest, and pragmatic solutions to complex social problems.  
 
In contrast, France’s democratic revolution of 1789, a civil war that, as predicted by the 
English parliamentarian at the time, Edmund Burke, turned into an international war 
under Napoleon Bonaparte, erupted within the confines of a rigid but waning feudal 
system. Rebelling against a class system topped by a sprawling privileged but 
unproductive aristocratic class, its inequities immortalized by Victor Hugo in his Les 
Miserables, the French revolutionaries, both of the Girondin and Jacobin persuasion, 
took their inspiration from the writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau. Unlike Locke, 
Rousseau emphasized the community rather than the individual in democracy. Public 
policy should put into effect what Rousseau called the volonté générale or general will, 
meaning the moral essence of the community as opposed to the majority rule of 
individual or particular wills. The abiding question as to how the general will should be 
discovered and articulated remains unanswered in Rousseau who, however, stipulated 
that those who do not align themselves with the general will should be forced to be free.5  
Basically, French democracy tends to be corporate in conception with an emphasis on 
the equality of the corporate members. 
                                                 
5 Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Social Contract. Great Books of the Western World. Robert Maynard Hutchins, 
ed. Encyclopaedia Britannica., Inc. Chicago. 1952 Book I. chapter 7. p. 393. 




These two models of democracy, the American and the French, persist and shape 
respective domestic policies and, importantly for our purposes, also foreign policy. The 
American critique of French colonialism in Asia, as mentioned previously, stemmed 
from these differences in democratic approach; the Americans have felt their model, as 
exhibited by their policies in the Philippines, superior. Today the United States supports 
a neo-liberal world order predicated upon a Westphalian state structure. Realism or the 
pursuit of national self-interest remains the cornerstone of this Westphalian system. 
While the United States has promoted world organizations like the United Nations, 
indeed its own President Woodrow Wilson advocated the League of Nations, it always 
assumes, in the spirit of Lockean social contract theory, the underlying sovereignty of 
the members of such world organizations. Military capability is the ultimate defense of 
such sovereignty and, consequently, the United States sees hard or military power as an 
essential ingredient of political power in the international arena. 
 
The French model of democracy generally characterizes European states and the 
European Union in general. Europeans shared a common historical experience, 
especially n their experience of feudalism. Despite his Protestant family, Rousseau 
regarded himself as Catholic and his thinking reflects ingredients of Catholic social 
philosophy which stresses government’s paternalistic responsibility for the community. 
Europeans view the state as provider and protector. Protestant, frontier America --
where the state and its law were more often than not far away and even deliberately kept 
at bay, emphasizes the primacy of the private sphere over that of the public. Europeans 
would find the notion of self reliance espoused by the New England transcendentalist, 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, harsh and unfair. They might even find it anarchic. Indeed 
Europeans visiting the United States tend to find this New World country chaotic and 
insubordinate – especially the jaywalking and the “open” classrooms in the schools. All 
European states have an infinitely more elaborate safety net system of social 
entitlements than the United States does. The health care issue alone demonstrates the 
great divide between the Europeans and Americans regarding the role of the state. In 
the United States a public health care system is a politically contested issue while in 
Europe it remains self-evident. 
 
France spearheaded European integration. One could perhaps argue that France 
“subconsciously” sought to complete the work that Napoleon Bonaparte failed to 
accomplish – to unite Europe through the democratic ideals of 1789. Jean Monnet 
stands out as a, if not the, leading Europeanist and, interestingly, Monnet conceived of 
Europe as a “United States of Europe,” a concept that the Americans latched onto. 
Coming from the region of Cognac where his family had a small brandy distillery, 
Monnet writes in his autobiography that from his earliest childhood he was exposed to 
foreigners who came to do business in Cognac. He also travelled on behalf of his father’s 
business to America, which, he writes, he came to love. The upshot of this birthright, in 
his own words, was that Monnet did not develop strong nationalist feelings but rather 
felt himself an internationalist. One might argue that this sentiment revealed him as a 
true child of the French revolution whose ideals were meant to be universalized and 
qualified him, therefore, to be instrumental in the transformation of post World War II 
Europe. 




The concentration camps opened after World War II proved conclusively that Europe 
needed transformation. A moral transformation. Civilized Europe has the singular 
distinction of having engineered the most massive genocide in world history, thanks to 
its technological advancement. Felix Horkheimer in his book, The Dialectic of the 
Enlightenment, coined the term, “industrial genocide,” to describe the massive 
onslaught. A German leader of Austrian origin, Adolf Hitler, conceived and 
implemented the genocidal policy aimed primary at Europe’s Jews but which included 
Roma and homosexuals. The death count of six million Jews is now being corrected as 
mass graves of Jews are being unearthed in the Ukraine, primarily through the efforts of 
the French priest, Father Patrick Desbois.6 The number of dead is projected to climb at 
least another two million, perhaps more, as more mass grave sites in the Ukraine are 
discovered. And this number does not include non-Jews who were killed in the camps 
and elsewhere. While Germany spawned the genocidal policy, Hitler proclaimed that it 
would have been impossible to carry the policy out without the complicity of other 
European states. 
 
As the concentration camps were opened at the close of World War II – Dachau, 
Bergen-Belsen, Buchenwald, Auschwitz, Theresienstadt, and “crimes against humanity” 
became written into international law through the Nuremberg Trials, the Holocaust, as 
intent and as deed, overshadowed Europe. What did European civilization mean?   
 
Within this context European integration became a moral imperative. Integrationists 
excoriated nationalism as the cause of conflict and war in Europe’s troubled history. 
Becoming economically interdependent through merged infrastructures which 
eventually would lead to political integration would make war undesirable and thus, 
hopefully, impossible. Europe would lay down its arms, reconstitute itself and become 
an exemplar of moral vision. Integrated Europe would embrace soft power. 
 
The European Union versus the United States 
 
It is no secret that the European Union faults the United States for its reliance upon 
hard power. The EU argues that the United States sees all political problems through 
the prism of the military. The Allied victory in World War II propelled the United States 
into a world leadership position that it had no responsible choice but to accept,  
especially given the onslaught of the Cold War immediately after the war. That position 
has not resulted in imperial conquests but has, instead, weighed heavily upon the 
shoulders of American citizens who pay their taxes for diverse foreign policy 
expenditures that include foreign aid as well as military preparedness and who have 
suffered the loss of family members in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq, to name 
but the outstanding conflicts. In the aftermath of World War II foreign aid expenditures 
                                                 
6 cf. P. Desbois. The Holocaust by Bullets: A Priest’s Journey to Uncover the Truth behind the Murder of 
1.5 Million Ukrainian Jews. New York, Palgrave Macmillan. 2009. In the forward Paul A. Shapiro writes: 
“The Holocaust by Bullets project has memorial and testimonial significance beyond anything we have 
encountered for a long time. The mass grave sites strewn across Ukraine inspire horror, but require 
reverence. Most of the sites will never be located if not found now, while eyewitnesses to the killings can 
identify them.” (p. xii) 
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included the Marshall Plan that allowed Europeans to rebuild and to begin integration, 
which the United States wholeheartedly supported and fostered.  
 
The terrorist attack on New York City on 9/11/2001 (as well as on Washington, D.C.) 
traumatized the American nation. For the Bush Administration, national security 
became a number one priority. The Iraq invasion followed and created the great divide 
between Europe and the United States. Leading European intellectuals like Juergen 
Habermas and Jacques Derrida published on May 31, 2003 individual articles opposing 
the war in seven European newspapers. Millions of European citizens took to the streets 
in London, Paris, Berlin, Madrid, Barcelona and Rome against the war in Iraq. Elizabeth 
Economy cites similar reactions in Southeast Asia: “The White House doctrine of 
preemption, unilateralism and invasion of Iraq led to a precipitous decline in America’s 
reputation among many publics throughout the world, including those in Southeast 
Asia.”7    
 
Similarly, subsequently with Afghanistan, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates 
charged that public and political opposition to the military has become so predominant 
in Europe that it is impeding the action in Afghanistan and adversely affecting the 
NATO alliance.8 According to Gates NATO is under-financed and in need of helicopters 
and cargo aircraft, but only 5 of the 28 NATO members have reached the established 
target of 2% of GDP for defense spending. The United States spends more than 4$ of its 
GDP on military expenses. 
 
From the American point of view, post-World War II Europe had the luxury of tending 
to its own economic restoration and development under the protective umbrella of the 
American-led NATO alliance. This remains the case. Ultimately, the United States and 
NATO brought the Yugoslav/Bosnia/Kosovo conflict to resolution, not the Europeans. 
Europeans hailed the 2008 election of Barack Obama, believing they finally had an 
American president who thought like them, and bestowed upon Obama the Nobel Peace 
Prize before he had made any world initiatives. Perhaps their enthusiasm was 
premature. In a New York Times op-ed Ross Douthat looked at “Obama the Realist:” 
 
…from the war on terror to the current unrest in Egypt, his [Obama’s] foreign 
policy has owed far more to conservative realpolitik than to any left-wing vision 
of international affairs…. There are moments when American presidents can 
afford to stand uncompromisingly with democratic revolutionaries. But they need 
someone to stand for. In the Soviet bloc in the1980’s, Ronald Reagan had Lech 
Walesa, Vaclav Havel, Pope John Paul II – and ultimately Mikhail Gorbachev. In 
Egypt Obama has Mohammed El Baradei, the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
crowds: the first Dubious as grass-roots leader, the second dangerous, and the 
third perilously disorganized. This is a situation that calls for great caution, 
rather than grand idealistic gestures. And it calls for a certain measure of relief, 
from the American public, that this liberal president’s foreign policy instincts 
have turned out to be so temperamentally conservative.9 
                                                 
7 Economy, ‘China’s Rise in Southeast Asia,’ Journal of Contemporary China. op cit. p. 411. 
8 New York Times. February 24, 2010. 
9 R. Douthat, ‘Obama the Realist,’ New York Times. Op-ed February 7, 2011. p A23 




We intend no evaluation of President Obama here. The point to be made is that in an 
idealistic world we would, no doubt, all relish the absence of military (hard) power. We 
do not, however, inhabit such a world. Though soft power advocates tend to assume that 
they walk the moral high ground, great harm and injustice can be done by a failure to 
act, also militarily. Times and situations pertain when moral duty requires the call to 
arms. Indeed we have a rich legacy of international jurisprudence regarding the 
circumstances and conditions of just war. 
 
A Two Track Policy 
 
To depict our present day world as a Manichean choice between soft power and hard 
power appears unrealistic in the extreme. Janice Bially Mattern breaks ground with her 
trenchant analysis of soft power conceptually and operationally. Mattern defines soft 
power as the attempt to achieve desired outcomes through attraction rather than 
through coercion.10  Attraction can be either natural or the result of persuasive 
argument. Neither of these forms of attraction, argues Mattern, is feasible in world 
politics. For attraction to be effective politically, it should rather be modeled as a 
relationship through representational force. Mattern portrays this representational 
force as a non-physical but nevertheless coercive form of power conveyed through 
language. In her analysis Mattern rejects the notion that soft power stands diametrically 
opposed to hard power. Rather soft power is a continuation of hard power by other 
means. 
 
An example of representational force might be the so-called element clause in European 
Union development treaties like the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP 1990) or 
the more recent Union for the Mediterranean (UPM 2008). The element clause 
constitutes a sanction clause. Development aid will be interrupted if democratic reforms 
or protection of human rights, for example, do not proceed. Criticism has been leveled 
against Europe for overlooking human rights violations in order to avoid enforcing the 
element clause. 
 
Another term for soft power that is gaining currency is normative power. The concept of 
normative power and a normative actor is assiduously analyzed in Nathalie Tocci’s 
edited volume, Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and Its 
Global Partners.11  The European Union, the United States, Russia, China and India are 
prominent actors discussed. The conclusion drawn from the discussion in this book is 
that all states think of themselves as pursuing a normative foreign policy. Clearly, there 
are various interpretations of what normative really means or entails. Normative always 
reflects norms or values. A normative foreign policy may, however, be one that wants to 
change the prevailing value system internationally. Or, then again, it may indicate a 
compliance with stipulated norms while, possibly, a rejection of other norms. It does not 
                                                 
10 cf. J.B. Mattern, ‘Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t so Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic 
Construction of Attraction in World Politics,’ in Millennium: Journal of International Studies. Vol. 33. 
No. 3, 2005. pp. 583-612. 
11 cf. Nathalie Tocci (ed.), Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and Its Global 
Partners. Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2008. 
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necessarily manifest itself as a preference for soft power. The United States, for 
example, believes it follows a normative foreign policy predicated upon the pursuit of 
democratic and neoliberal values internationally but employs hard power in certain 
given circumstances (like Iraq). 
 
In contradistinction, the European Union sees itself as a soft and normative power. 
Moreover, it links these attributes to yet a third defining characteristic, namely, 
multilateralism. Economically, multilateralism refers to the convertibility of national 
currencies on a non-discriminatory basis. The G-20 stands as the principal forum for 
coordinating the international economy. In 2009 the G-20 created the Financial 
Stability Board to strengthen the standards for international finance. 
 
Within international treaty regimes multilateralism designates investment in the 
creation and maintenance of international institutions and compliance with the rules, 
norms, principles, and decision-making processes of such institutions. Multilateralism 
becomes conceptually cloudy in the realm of political action, including military 
intervention. Minimalists like Robert Keohane define multilateralism as an 
international decision-making process that involves three or more states either on an ad 
hoc basis or institutionalized. Other scholars seek to enrich this minimalist definition by 
adding qualifiers. For example, actors in a multilateral decision-making structure 
should involve a mix of greater and lesser powers. Three or more Great Powers making a 
decision that affects lesser powers lacks the moral ingredient, according to this 
argument, that some wish to convey with multilateralism. Military intervention poses 
particular problems for defining multilateralism. Did the few hundred troops 
contributed by Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica and St. Lucia to the American intervention 
in Grenada make this a multilateral action?  
 
From the European point-of-view multilateralism entails not only membership in 
international organizations like the United Nations. It also requires that states be 
signatories to international treaties like the Kyoto Treaty (environmental regulations) 
and the International Criminal Court. By this standard the United States does not 
behave multilaterally. The European Union sees the United States as a unilateralist, a 
perspective not necessarily accepted by the United States itself. Europeans complain 
that the United States does not consult with them more and on a regular basis regarding 
American strategic policy and decisions. This complaint widens the meaning of 
multilateralism to include routine consultation among allies. 
 
The differences between Europe and the United States are real but not insurmountable. 
Their differences are akin to sibling rivalry. Some Europeans would vehemently disagree 
with this assessment, claiming, rather, that these two powers live in two separate 
ideational worlds. Indeed for some Europeans anti-Americanism has been elevated to 
an identity marker. As Andrei Markovits posits, in still fractured Europe, anti-
Americanism serves as the most reliable glue for achieving a common European 
identity.12  Robert Kagan has a point in stating that Europeans miscalculated, to their 
                                                 
12 cf. A. S. Markovits. Uncouth Nation: Why Europe Dislikes Americans. Princeton University Press, 
2007. 
Bevan, ANZJES 3(2) 
74 
 
detriment, the post-World War II importance of economic power.13  The 2011 euro 
crisis, to which we shall return, has sapped Europe’s political confidence and its sense of 
self. The United States continues to loom in European memory as the Great Protector 
from whom it does not seem to be able to lose itself. Jeremy Shapiro and Nick Whitney, 
writing for the European Council on Foreign Relations, mince no words when they 
describe “…the European attitude to the United States as infantile and fetishistic.”14  
They continue: “… the idea that the future of the relationship in which they [Europeans] 
are so heavily invested lies in their own hands will not be easy to accept. America wants 
to be Europe’s partner, not its patron; but it cannot be responsible from without for 
weaning Europe off its client status.”15 
 
We live in a fast changing world in which new power strategies must be devised and 
employed. Soft power alone, just as hard power alone, does not suffice and is thus 
ineffective. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. stipulates that “the coming decades are not likely to see a 
post-American world, but the United States will need a smart strategy that combines 
hard- and soft- power resources – and that emphasizes alliances and networks that are 
responsive to the next context of a global information age.”16 Publishing an article in 
Foreign Affairs, thereby signalling a policy statement, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton announced the new “public diplomacy strategy” of the United States. Clinton 
writes: 
 
In this information age, public opinion takes on added importance even in authoritarian 
states and as nonstate actors are more able to influence current events. Today a US 
ambassador creates ties not only with the host nation’s government but also with its 
people. The QDDR (Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review in the State 
Department) endorses a new public diplomacy strategy that makes public engagement 
every diplomat’s duty,  through town-hall meetings and interviews with the media, 
organized outreach, events in provincial towns and smaller communities, student 
exchange programs and virtual connections that bring together citizens and civic 
organizations. Indeed, in the twenty-first century, a diplomat is as likely to meet with a 
tribal elder in a rural village as a counterpart in a foreign ministry, and is as likely to 
wear cargo-pants as a pinstriped suit.17 
 
Clinton uses the term “civilian power” to designate the new public diplomacy, a term 
that once was a part of the European Union’s vocabulary when it was still the European 
Community. Can the United States and the European Union form a partnership based 
on a two-track policy of cooperative hard and soft power, multilateralism and realism? 
 
                                                 
13 cf. R. Kagan. Of Paradise and Power ,New York, Alfred A. Knopf. 2003. 
14 J. Shapiro and N. Whitney. Towards a Post-American Europe: A Power Audit of EU-US Relations. 
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2009. p. 61. 
15 Ibid. 
16 J. S. Nye, Jr. ‘The Future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective,’ Foreign Affairs. 
November/December 2010. p. 12. 
17 Hillary Rodham Clinton. ‘Leading Through Civilian Power: Redefining American Diplomacy and 
Development.,’ Foreign Affairs. November/December 2010. p. 16. 
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Two Tracks and Asia 
 
The European Union looks with great interest at the regional integration efforts in 
Southeast Asia. Could ASEAN become the European Union of Southeast Asia? As 
mentioned, Europeans see regional integration as the pathway to global peace and 
economic prosperity. European development funds are channelled into projects abroad 
which foster such regional integration – like ASEAN. In 2007 the European Union 
signed the Nuremberg Declaration with ASEAN which commits both parties to 
cooperating in political, security, economic, socio-cultural and economic development 
as well as in the fields of energy security and the environment. 
 
ASEAN members, however, reject the European Union as the model for regional 
integration. For Asians, the European Union is a model for regional integration but not 
the model. With their own tumultuous histories that include imperial/colonial 
subjection and with highly diverse populations including conflictual ethnic minorities in 
still weak states, ASEAN states seek to preserve and strengthen their own newly 
acquired national sovereignty. In its most recent 2011 skirmish with Cambodia over the 
Preah Vihear temple site, Thailand insisted upon dealing with Cambodia on a bilateral 
basis and refused the intervention of outside organizations like the U.N. Security 
Council. ASEAN states do not aspire to any kind of multilateral organization like NATO. 
Quite the contrary. Furthermore, ASEAN states insist upon sovereign currencies. They 
fault Europe’s common currency for confounding Europe’s ability to deal with the 
current euro crisis and credit the sovereign currencies of ASEAN for ASEAN states’ 
relatively swift recovery from the recession. 
 
Moreover, while Europeans criticize the United States for its hard power approach to 
political problems, ASEAN puts Europe to the test. Amitav Acharya writes in this 
regard: 
 
Asia’s regional institutions are often dismissed by many Western critics as ‘talk 
shops’ but European regional institutions are not without shortcomings and 
limitations as well. The Russian invasion of Georgia, following conflicts in Bosnia 
and Kosovo, shows that peace in Europe can not be taken for granted, while 
stability in Asia, where no major war has taken place since 1979 (with the 
exception of the India-Pakistan conflict over Kargil) can be understated. The 
Georgian crisis also says something about EU and OSCE (Organisation of 
Security and Cooperation in Europe) which despite the elaborate toolkit of 
confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, early warning mechanisms, failed to 
prevent what may turn out to be the most serious breach of international order 
since the USinvasion of Iraq. By contrast, Asia’s supposedly weak and ineffectual 
talk shops, by discouraging an American-led containment of China, by making 
multilateralism palatable to Beijing and using the resulting Sino-US restraint to 
soften the region’s balance of power geopolitics, have prevented a Georgia in the 
region.18 
                                                 
18 A. Acharya. Regionalism and Integration EU and Southeast Asia Experiences. International Cultural 
Dialogue. Bertelsmann Stiftung. (No publication year listed.) 




ASEAN continues to think in terms of the Westphalian state. For Asia, especially 
Southeast Asia, the soft power, multilateral model of the European Union has economic 
attraction, with the exception of the common currency, but limited political attraction. 
The European Union is seen as a “peace investor” and “peace facilitator,” investing in 
economic development, good governance, human rights and democracy promotion. An 
example of this would be the Partnership for Democratic Local Governance in Southeast 
Asia (DELGOSEA), funded by the European Commission and the Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung of Germany and launched in March 2010 to exchange good governance 
practices on the local level in the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand and 
Cambodia. 
 
Were Europeans to use soft power as a stimulus for regional integration in Asia à la 
Europe, they would find themselves not only rebuffed but considered in violation of 
national sovereignty, of interfering with Asian states’ internal affairs. Here we have a 
perfect example of Janice Bially Mattern’s ethical dilemma regarding soft power. 
Mattern writes: “In my opinion a power politics of identity, however unappealing, is 
normatively more appealing that the power politics of war, empire and physical 
conquest. But even so, one must still question the moral logic of representational force. 
Given that soft power may, in the end, not be all that soft, it is worth considering the 
ethical dimensions and dilemmas that arise when using it as a ‘means to success in 
world politics.’”19 
 
ASEAN states continue to look to the United States for hard power security. Such 
security relates primarily to China. Elizabeth Economy, however, warns that the United 
States must be ever mindful of its own strategic interests since the “China card” may 
also be used against the United States, especially as an outside regional actor. As 
Stewart Patrick states: “There is, of course, no common worldview among today’s 
emerging countries. But as U.S. power declines, the rising powers will seek to test, 
dilute, or revise existing institutions to suit their purposes. The United States will need 
to decide when to stand firm, when to engage, and when simply to agree to disagree.”20 
 
Asia demands strategies and employments of mixed power – hard and soft. It favors 
regional cooperation and limited integration. It emphasizes national sovereignty and 
bilateralism. It wants, like the European Union and the United States, open markets and 
open seas. Perhaps, as Kant envisioned, free trade will result in free governance globally. 
 
The conclusion seems inescapable. Mutual benefit is the calling card of our globalized 
world. In partnership, the European Union and the United States can be a force for 
enormous benefit for themselves and for others. Those Euroskeptics who see the present 
euro crisis as the collapse not only of Euroland but of the European Union itself will be 
sorely disappointed. The crisis – though certainly severe in terms of the bailouts for 
Ireland, Greece and Spain, with Italy not far behind, has in fact prompted the next step 
in political integration. Recognizing that Europe cannot be allowed to “go under,” 
                                                 
19 Mattern. op. cit.. pp. 611-12. 
20 S. Patrick. “Irresponsible Stakeholders? The Difficulty of Integrating Rising Powers.” Foreign Affairs. 
November/December 2010. p. 50. 
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Sarkozy of France and Merkel of Germany now call for the empowerment of the 
European Central Bank and a tightening of across-the-board fiscal regulations. Europe 
will more than survive; it will grow, though the road be rocky.  
 
The United States and the European Union, even in a post-Eurocentric world, still 
constitute the most formidable economic, social and political power hubs. They have 
much to offer the world. The world can only benefit from the partnership of the United 
States and Europe that allows each to contribute its own specialty and genius to the 
development and well-being of others and, in return, benefit themselves from an open 
global exchange. At the same time cooperation between the United States and Europe 
will enhance these partners who have shared so much over more than two centuries.  
 
The problem with Realism is that it got stuck in the state-of-nature depiction of Thomas 
Hobbes as a “bellum omnium contra omnes – a war of all against all.”  Modern 
evolutionary biology informs us that the secret of homo sapiens’ evolutionary success 
lies in the species’ cooperative spirit. John Locke implicitly understood this. Liberal 
democracy would be impossible without this cooperative spirit, this ability to build 
social capital. Locke depicted the state of nature not as a situation of war but as a 
situation of inconvenience – individuals had to do everything, including defending their 
rights, on their own in the state of nature. The rational solution of peaceable, rational 
individuals was the state, basically a contractual division of labor that made life so much 
simpler by allowing individuals to take advantage of the skills of others like farmers, 
carpenters, weavers -- and governing representatives, to supply and take care of their 
daily needs so that they could think about developing themselves in whatever way they 
chose. Consider this description of our global world. The newest aspect of globalization 
is global manufacturing supply services where a “Malaysian architect will sketch out a 
new office tower for London, a Philippine architect will prepare detailed renderings, and 
a Chinese engineer will assess the structural soundness of the designs.” 21 Does this not 
sound like Locke’s idea of the state as a division of labor?  Has the global society not 
become a global division of labor? We increasingly live in a world in which cooperation, 
not conflict, is the key to success. Can an international social contract be far behind? 
Does an American-European partnership not make sense? 
 
                                                 
21 J. Sternberg, 'Now Comes the Global Revolution in Services,’ New York Times. February 10, 2010. p. 
A17. 
